Analyzing 210 developing country private equity investments, we find that transactions vary with nations ’ legal enforcement, whether measured directly or through legal origin. Investments in high enforcement and common law nations often use convertible preferred stock with covenants. In low enforcement and civil law nations, private equity groups tend to use common stock and debt, and rely on equity and board control. Transactions in high enforcement countries have higher valuations and returns. While relying on ownership rather than contractual provisions may help to alleviate legal enforcement problems, these results suggest that private solutions are only a partial remedy. I
This paper studies the impact of legal institutions on stock returns. More specifically, we examine ...
Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books or voluntary codes is key to effective corporat...
How does the relationship between an investor and entrepreneur depend on the le-gal system? In a dou...
The intensity of enforcement efforts by securities regulators varies widely among financially develo...
While variations in public securities markets across nations have attracted increasing scrutiny, pri...
We argue that in an unreliable enforcement regime, transactions tend to become intermediated through...
Ascertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent ...
This article examines how private equity returns in Asia are related to levels of legal protection a...
This paper joins the literature examining connections between le-gal protection of investors and Þna...
Better legal protection of investors in a country is a central theme of international corporate gove...
While excessive regulation is an obstacle to the development of financial markets, we argue that lac...
The Article surveys the growing law and finance literature providing evidence that legal protections...
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the ori...
An emerging “bonding hypothesis ” holds that a firm’s geographic domicile may not determine its corp...
It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareho...
This paper studies the impact of legal institutions on stock returns. More specifically, we examine ...
Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books or voluntary codes is key to effective corporat...
How does the relationship between an investor and entrepreneur depend on the le-gal system? In a dou...
The intensity of enforcement efforts by securities regulators varies widely among financially develo...
While variations in public securities markets across nations have attracted increasing scrutiny, pri...
We argue that in an unreliable enforcement regime, transactions tend to become intermediated through...
Ascertaining which enforcement mechanisms work to protect investors has been both a focus of recent ...
This article examines how private equity returns in Asia are related to levels of legal protection a...
This paper joins the literature examining connections between le-gal protection of investors and Þna...
Better legal protection of investors in a country is a central theme of international corporate gove...
While excessive regulation is an obstacle to the development of financial markets, we argue that lac...
The Article surveys the growing law and finance literature providing evidence that legal protections...
This paper examines legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders and creditors, the ori...
An emerging “bonding hypothesis ” holds that a firm’s geographic domicile may not determine its corp...
It is often assumed that strong securities markets require good legal protection of minority shareho...
This paper studies the impact of legal institutions on stock returns. More specifically, we examine ...
Enforcement more than regulations, laws-on-the-books or voluntary codes is key to effective corporat...
How does the relationship between an investor and entrepreneur depend on the le-gal system? In a dou...